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 ABSTRACT 
The International Drivers of Domestic Airline Mergers in Twenty Nations:  
Integrating Industrial Organization and International Business 
by Joseph A. Clougherty*
The domestic airline merger phenomenon of the late 1980s and early 1990s 
sparked a great deal of Industrial Organization (IO) literature; yet, that literature 
neglected non-US domestic mergers and potential for international competitive 
gains. Using an International Business perspective to complement an IO 
analysis, I argue that factoring international competitive incentives helps explain 
domestic airline merger activity. A Cournot model of airline competition 
illustrates that domestic mergers, via enhanced domestic networks and reduced 
domestic competition, generate international competitive gains. Further, 
empirical tests—using a structural-equations approach on panel data covering 
international city-pair market segments—support domestic mergers improving 
international competitiveness. 
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 ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Was die inländischen Fluglinien in 20 Ländern zur Fusion getrieben hat. 
Eine integrierte industrieökonomische und betriebswirtschaftliche 
Analyse des internationalen Wettbewerbs 
In der Industrieökonomik hat das Phänomen von Fusionen inländischer 
Fluggesellschaften in den späten 1980er und frühen 1990er Jahren viel 
wissenschaftliche Literatur angeregt. Die einschlägigen Forschungsarbeiten 
behandeln jedoch ausschließlich inländische Fusionen in den U.S.A. und lassen 
damit den Aspekt des internationalen Wettbewerbs außer Acht. In dieser 
Untersuchung, die die industrieökonomische Analyse um die Perspektive der 
internationalen Betriebswirtschaft ergänzt, wird gezeigt, dass die Anreize des 
internationalen Wettbewerb in das Erklärungsmodell für nationale Fusionen von 
Fluglinien integriert werden können. Anhand eines Cournot-Modells des 
Wettbewerbs zwischen Fluggesellschaften kann dargelegt werden, wie 
Fusionen zu einem erweiterten inländischen Netz an Flugverbindungen und 
verminderten Konkurrenzdruck im Inland führen und so die Position der 
fusionierten Fluglinie im internationalen  Wettbewerb stärken. Dieses Ergebnis 
wird von empirischen Tests, die eine Struckturvergleichsmethode für 
Paneldaten über einen internationalen Städtevergleich der Marktsegmente 
verwenden, gestützt. 
iv 
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INTRODUCTION 
 A number of domestic airline mergers—the TWA/Ozark and Northwest/Republic 
pairings being most notable—occurred in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Pustay, 1992). The 
high profile nature of these mergers led to a substantial amount of Industrial Organization 
(IO) literature that split along the familiar market-power (Kim and Singal, 1993; Werden et 
al., 1991; Borenstein, 1989; U.S. General Accounting Office, 1988) versus efficiency-gains 
(Brueckner and Spiller, 1991, 1994; Brueckner et al., 1992; Levine, 1987) lines. As for what 
drove merger activity, one could extrapolate the following from the literature: the market-
power camp favoring merged airlines’ ability to raise fares via reduced competition, and the 
efficiency-gains camp favoring merged airlines’ ability to reduce costs via hub-and-spoke 
networks. Yet, the IO literature was less concerned with merger motives and more concerned 
with social welfare implications. Beyond understudying motivations, the literature neglected 
that domestic airline mergers involved significant international dimensions. 
While the IO literature focused on US domestic merger activity, the domestic airline 
merger phenomenon was actually cross-national in scope as domestic mergers occurred in 
many nations beyond the US: e.g., British Air acquired British Caledonia, Air France 
acquired Air Inter.1 Accordingly, the term ‘cross-national’ refers here to domestic airline 
merger activity (where the acquirer and target have operations in the same home-nation) not 
being restricted to one nation (i.e., the US). Nevertheless, airline consolidation has certainly 
taken on different forms: international airline alliances (see Brueckner (2003) for a short 
literature review) commenced in the early 1990s; an additional wave of domestic 
consolidation (e.g., Air Canada/Canadian; American/TWA; JAL/Japan Air Systems) 
occurred in the late 1990s; and cross-border acquisitions (e.g., SwissAir/Sabena; 
AirFrance/KLM) have been a recent manifestation. Yet, this study focuses simply on the 
domestic airline mergers of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Moreover, the point here is that 
  2
the IO literature responding to airline merger activity did not take into account the cross-
national scope of the phenomenon. 
The IO literature also focused on the domestic competitive effects of airline mergers; 
thus, paying little heed to any strategic relationship between domestic mergers and 
international competitive outcomes. Recent ‘revisionist’ IO articles—Morrison and Winston 
(2000) and Clougherty (2002)—begin exploring the international competitive incentives 
behind domestic airline mergers, but restrict the scope to US mergers. Neglecting 
international competitive effects owes in part to the focus on US merger activity, as sizable 
US domestic markets favor domestic competitive incentives primarily driving merger 
behavior. However, neglecting international incentives appears problematic when one 
realizes the cross-national nature of the airline merger phenomenon. Many mergers occurred 
in nations where the economic-weight of international markets outweighs that of domestic 
markets; in such markets, firms would seemingly consider the international incentives behind 
domestic actions.2 Domestic airline mergers also occurred in some nations (e.g., France) prior 
to domestic deregulation; in such markets, mergers might seemingly be a response to 
international competitive realities—not regulated domestic realities.  
In sum, a comprehensive study of the world domestic-airline merger phenomenon 
requires understanding both the cross-national scope and the international competitive 
incentives behind domestic merger activity. The reasoning and analysis here are primarily 
economic (IO in particular) in nature; yet, a subtext throughout the work is that the 
International Business (IB) literature complements an IO analysis. Specifically, two 
fundamental tenets of IB (international implications factor in the domestic actions of 
businesses, and the analytical lens should consider cross-national business activity—Nehrt et 
                                                                                                                                                        
1 See Table 2 later in the paper for a complete list of domestic airline mergers within the data set employed here. 
2 Ninety percent of US airlines’ traffic is domestic, but Canadian carriers find international markets equaling the size of 
domestic markets, and smaller nations--like the Netherlands--find international markets far outweighing domestic markets. 
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al., 1970) might have helped the IO literature factor the cross-national scope and the 
international competitive incentives involved with domestic airline mergers. 
The paper consists of one overriding main contention – domestic airline mergers were 
driven by international competitive incentives in addition to the domestic competitive 
incentives focused on by the pre-existing literature – and the logic behind this argument 
involves two causal paths. First, a network-expansion effect where domestic airline mergers 
enhance domestic networks, larger domestic networks generate crucial passenger traffic that 
increases the efficiency of international operations, and more-efficient airlines earn greater 
traffic and profits in imperfectly competitive international markets. Second, a network-
consolidation effect where domestic airline mergers eliminate domestic competition, less 
domestic competition allows airlines to increase the efficiency of domestic operations (an 
input into international service),  and airlines with more efficient domestic operations earn 
greater traffic and profits in imperfectly competitive international markets. In short, 
airlines—circa the late 1980s—faced a strategic incentive to both expand and consolidate 
their domestic network operations via mergers in order to improve international 
competitiveness. 
 In order to both frame the main contention and formally set testable propositions, the 
paper proceeds as follows. The next section nests the main contention within the relevant 
literature while discussing three necessary conditions for the contention to hold and the two 
causal paths by which domestic airline mergers promote international competitiveness. The 
subsequent section presents a simple Cournot model that captures the essentials of 
international airline competition and helps generate two formal propositions that illustrate the 
network-expansion and network-consolidation effects. The last substantive section presents a 
methodological approach – drawing from both panel data and structural equations procedures 
– to empirically estimate the impact and causal paths by which domestic airline mergers 
affect international competitive outcomes. 
  4
 
THREE NECESSARY CONDITIONS & TWO CAUSAL PATHS 
 The paper’s fundamental argument – that domestic airline mergers were driven by 
international competitive incentives as well as domestic incentives – rests upon the presence 
of three general economic conditions (segmentation of international and domestic markets; 
imperfectly competitive markets; and existence of economies) identified by Krugman (1984) 
as necessary for a national-champion rationale to hold.  
 First, domestic city-pair markets have traditionally been the exclusive territory of 
home-nation airlines (Pustay, 1992), while international city-pair markets generally exhibit 
significant competitive barriers due to their traditionally being the exclusive territory of the 
pair-nation’s designated airlines (de Murias, 1989). The distinction between domestic and 
international markets is, hence, an important one—one that is mirrored in a number of other 
studies (e.g., Pustay, 1989; Weisman, 1990; Ramamurti & Sarathy, 1997; Clougherty, 2001, 
2002). Further, it is generally agreed that city-pair markets are the appropriate level-of-
analysis for airline industry competition (Morrison & Winston, 1987). While the empirical 
analysis in this work is faithful to the importance of analyzing city-pair outcomes, the 
immediate point is that classifying individual city-pair markets into domestic and 
international markets adds important heuristic insights.  
 Second, imperfectly competitive international markets provide an incentive for 
airlines to engage in efficiency-enhancing endeavors since profits accrue to low-cost 
providers. Despite the liberalization of the past two decades, international airline markets 
remain rather restricted. The regulatory and competitive entry barriers involved with 
international markets combine to ensure that strategic behavior determines market outcomes; 
i.e., entry barriers ensure the imperfectly competitive nature of these markets. The Cournot 
model of imperfect competition emphasizes quantity adjustments by a few firms and can 
reflect the long-term implications of international aviation competition. Kreps and 
  5
Scheinkman (1983) show that Cournot can apply to two-stage competition where firms first 
set quantity and then compete via prices. Cason (1994) notes that airline industry competition 
is quite similar with firms first setting quantity via quarterly schedules and then competing 
via prices to fill seats. Even more importantly, a number of scholars (Brander & Zhang, 1993, 
1990; Oum, Zhang & Zhang, 1993; Weisman, 1990) have empirically supported that Cournot 
models best reflect actual airline competition.   
Third, establishing hub-and-spoke networks is one means by which airlines improve 
efficiency. Airline networks take advantage of density economies (Caves et al., 1984), as 
average costs decrease significantly on a route and in a network with increased passenger 
numbers; i.e., airlines exhibit substantial density economies. Integrating routes into a network 
brings up the issue of scope economies, which are sometimes credited with explaining the 
rise of hub-and-spoke networks (Weisman, 1990). Economies of scope generally refer to the 
production of two goods or services being managed more efficiently by one firm than by two 
firms (Panzar & Willig, 1981). If one airline more efficiently provides service in two city-
pair markets than could two airlines, then scope economies are indicated. For instance, by 
consolidating a domestic service (e.g., L.A. to N.Y.) and matching it with an international 
service (e.g., N.Y. to London) an airline increases the number of passengers on each leg and 
reduces the average cost per passenger via density economies. Accordingly, the matching of 
different city-pair markets into a network brings about cost reductions; thus, economies from 
hub-and-spoke networks are often rightly referred to as scope economies (Besanko et al., 
2000). This broader scope-economies-type conceptualization of airline economies becomes 
important in the modeling section; for this reason and for convenience, the economies 
generated by airline networks will sometimes be referred to as scope-economies or network-
economies in this work. It is important to underscore, however, that these economies are 
founded on the existence of density economies--the matching and dominance of different 
airline routes promotes greater traffic density and increased capital asset utilization.  
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 The discussion above of the three necessary conditions (segmentation of international 
and domestic markets, imperfectly competitive markets, and firm economies) highlights how 
domestic airline mergers may improve international competitive performance; yet, here I 
draw out the specifics by which domestic airline mergers translate into international 
competitive outcomes. In particular, two causal paths are identified as connecting domestic 
airline mergers with improved international competitiveness: 1) a network-expansion effect; 
2) a network-consolidation effect. 
 The basic causal-thrust behind the network-expansion effect is that domestic airline 
mergers which enhance domestic networks lead to improved international performance. The 
intuition behind the network-expansion effect is as follows: First, domestic airline mergers 
generally increase the size of domestic networks as the acquired firm’s domestic network will 
augment the size of the acquiring firm’s domestic network. Second, larger domestic networks 
generate more passenger traffic for international route operations (drawing passengers from 
additional cities and passengers from competing home and foreign nation airlines) that 
translates into increased efficiency on the international operations via density economies. 
Third, airlines with more-efficient international operations earn greater traffic and profits in 
imperfectly competitive international markets. Accordingly, this first causal-flow between 
domestic mergers and international competitive performance can be summed up as follows: 
Domestic-Mergers ? ^ Domestic-Networks ? ^ International-Operation-Efficiency ? ^ 
International-Market-Performance       (1) 
The basic causal-thrust behind the network-consolidation effect is that domestic 
airline mergers which reduce competition in domestic routes lead to improved international 
performance. The intuition behind the network-consolidation effect is as follows: First, 
domestic airline mergers that eliminate domestic competition generally result in acquiring 
firms enhancing their dominance of domestic routes and markets. Second, airlines that face 
less domestic competition and dominate domestic routes can increase domestic operational 
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efficiency (an input into international service) by taking advantage of density economies. 
Third, airlines with more efficient domestic operations (i.e., more efficient international 
service that employs these domestic operations) earn greater traffic and profits in imperfectly 
competitive international markets. Accordingly, this second causal-flow between domestic 
mergers and international competitive performance can be summed up as follows: 
Domestic-Mergers ? ^ Domestic-Market-Dominance ? ^ Domestic-Operation-Efficiency ? 
^ International-Market-Performance       (2) 
It should be noted that the above dynamics do not represent the full-set of causal 
paths by which domestic airline mergers translate into international competitive outcomes. 
Domestic airline mergers may also generate international competitive gains via the demand-
side in a complementary manner to the supply-side argument espoused above. For instance, 
airline mergers that expand the set of domestic destinations for frequent-flyer-award 
redemption essentially alter a particular airline’s demand curve for international service as 
the ‘miles’ earned by such service become more valuable. Further, demand-side peculiarities 
(e.g., consumer loyalty to airline or national brands) may dampen the impact of efficiency-
enhancing mergers on international market outcomes.3 Despite the existence of potential 
demand-side factors, this analysis—akin to the IO literature on domestic airline mergers—
focuses on the supply-side implications of airline mergers on international competitiveness. 
 
A COURNOT MODEL OF INTERNATIONAL AIRLINE COMPETITION 
 The previous section attempts to set a thorough theoretical background by discussing 
the critical conditions for the main contention to hold and two causal paths by which 
domestic airline mergers translate into international competitive gains. This section takes a 
more formal approach by presenting a simple model that captures the essentials of airline 
competition, illustrates the network-expansion and network-consolidation incentives behind 
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domestic mergers, and formally yields propositions for empirical testing. The aim is to 
establish a complete theoretical foundation with both analytical richness and formal 
precision.  
The Cournot model set out below owes its domestic-international approach to Brander 
and Spencer (1987) and draws strongly for its aviation applicability from Weisman (1990). 
The cost function formulation underpins the model by creating the different market 
equilibrium outcomes. The total cost function takes the form:  
TC = c ∑ Xi  - s * X1  * X2  .....  * Xn 
Where X denotes quantity (passengers served in a city-pair market), i is an index of the 
number of routes in the network (i = 1,...,N), and s is a scope coefficient (where s>0) that 
broadly captures the efficiency effect of matching routes (Weisman, 1990).4  Constant 
average costs (c'=0) are assumed; hence, neither scale nor density economies are specified.  
The omission of scale economies is in line with previous research (Caves, 1962; 
Douglas & Miller, 1974; Keeler, 1978; White, 1979; Caves et al., 1984), but as already noted 
density economies are crucial to hub-and-spoke network economies. Instead of stipulating 
declining average costs, this model broadly captures network efficiency with the 
multiplicative term at the end of the cost function--the multiplicative term can be considered 
the cost savings of integrating routes within a network. It should be noted that scholars (e.g., 
Brueckner and Spiller, 1991, 1994; Brueckner et. al., 1992; Oum, Park & Zhang, 1996) have 
modeled airline competition with greater specification of density economies by stipulating 
decreasing average costs with more passengers in a route. The broad approach to modeling 
network-economies adopted here accordingly abstracts over the fact that larger networks 
                                                                                                                                                        
3 See Yoo & Ashford (1997) for a treatment of the propensity for consumers to prefer national brands. See also Brueckner & 
Whalen (2000) for a model of airline competition where consumers have brand loyalty.  
4 One could consider a merger scenario where s<0 (i.e., mergers involve diseconomies of scope). While the 
literature in Industrial Organization and Finance Economics suggests that many mergers do involve efficiency-
losses, the assumption here is that airline mergers are generally efficiency enhancing due to the regulated 
history of aviation (which precluded the search for purely efficient operational systems) and the importance of 
density economies. 
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improve efficiency because they facilitate the employment of density economies. Note that 
other scholars (e.g., Shy, 2001) also take a broad approach to representing network 
economies. Moreover, the competitive implications of the more-specified models and the 
broader approach to capturing network efficiencies employed here are similar: airlines with 
larger networks and less competition on market segments have lower costs and compete more 
effectively. 
 Three cases are presented to sharpen the analysis: Case A examines international 
duopoly competition without the presence of domestic networks; Case B examines 
international duopoly competition where one competitor has a domestic feed flight (a 
network) but faces a domestic competitor; Case C examines international duopoly 
competition where one competitor monopolizes the domestic route. The cases generate two 
propositions that exhibit the network-expansion and network-consolidation effects that 
underpin the main contention. 
 
Case A: International Competition Without Domestic Network Feed 
*** Place Figure 1 Near Here *** 
 This first scenario (illustrated in figure 1) has firms A and B competing in the 
international market (market #1) between points NY and UK, and firms C & D competing in 
the domestic market (market #2) between points LA and NY. Firms have no matching flights 
and reap no scope economies; hence, the cost functions are simple in this case, as s=0 when 
no matching flights exist. Further, suppose that symmetrical inverse demand functions can be 
written as follows: 
P1 = a – b (XA,1 + XB,1)          (a.1) 
P2 = a – b (XC,2 + XD,2)          (a.2) 
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where a represents the intercept and b the slope of the linear inverse demand function. 
Solving the familiar Cournot duopoly-competition outlined above leads to the following 
solution equations:  
X*A,1 = X*B,1 = X*C,2 = X*D,2  =  (a-c)/3b      (a.3) 
Π*A = Π*B = Π*C = Π*D = (a-c)2 /9b.       (a.4) 
Firms split the market output and profits in both the domestic and international markets in 
this standard solution concept.  
This simplest of cases acts as a useful benchmark for comparison with the next two 
cases; thus, it behooves us now to set some restrictions on the model parameters in order to 
only make economically meaningful comparisons. First, we will assume throughout that 
average costs are reasonable (i.e., a>c)—which simply ensures that firms have positive 
outputs and profits. Second, we will assume throughout that the demand curve slope is 
greater than the scope coefficient (i.e., b>s)—which simply ensures that the scope economies 
are not so great that the market equilibrium is beyond where the market demand curve lies 
above the supply curve. These conditions hold for the comparisons that follow. 
 
Case B: International Competition With Domestic Network Feed & Competition 
*** Place Figure 2 Near Here *** 
 The second scenario has firms A and B again competing in the international market 
(market #1) between points NY and UK (illustrated in figure 2). However, firm A replaces 
firm D—i.e., firm D is acquired—in the domestic market between points LA and NY (market 
#2) and competes against firm C. While firms B & C have simple cost functions, firm A 
matches flights and takes advantage of scope economies—firm A’s cost function takes the 
form: 
TC(A) = c (XA,1 + XA,2) - s XA,1 XA,2 .      (b.1) 
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 Again, assume identical demand functions in markets #1 and #2; i.e., equations a.1 
and a.2 are still the set of inverse demand functions. Not allowing a third inverse demand 
function to represent the LA – UK market is somewhat artificial; though, it does correspond 
to the interlining-era that dominated prior to the integration of domestic with international 
routes. The benefit of making such a simplifying assumption—that consumers are allowed to 
purchase flight segments in bundled and unbundled forms—resides with keeping things 
analytically and computationally tractable by focusing on the supply-side implications of 
route integration and disregarding any demand-side integration implications. More 
importantly, the general point being advanced here would also emerge from a more 
analytically complex treatment of airline competition in terms of both the demand and supply 
functions. For example, Brueckner and Whalen’s (2000) set-up of an airline-alliance 
competing with two non-aligned competitors is quite similar to the case here; yet, their more-
specific modeling of the demand and supply functions yields solution outcomes parallel to 
those here.  
The solution equations yield then symmetrical results for equilibrium market outputs: 
X*A,1 = X*A,2  = (a-c) / (3b-2s)        (b.2) 
X*B,1 = X*C,2  = (a-c) (b-s) / b (3b-2s) .      (b.3) 
Firm A has a larger output than both its competitors in markets #1 and #2. It can 
correspondingly be shown that firm A earns greater profits in both markets compared to its 
competitors. Firm A’s total profit is: 
Π*A = (2b-3s) (a-c)2 / (3b-2s) 2 .       (b.4) 
 Matching flights enables firm A to be the dominant player in both the international 
and domestic markets. Compared to Case A, where firm A competed against firm B without 
the aid of domestic feed, firm A’s international market output and profits have risen. It can be 
shown that firm A’s international output (market #1) has risen with the addition of a domestic 
route (market #2), as the right hand side of equation (b.2) is larger than the right hand side of 
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equation (a.3). It can also be shown that firm A’s international market profit has risen 
compared to Case A when it had no domestic routes. One half of the right hand side of 
equation (b.4) gives the profits earned by firm A in the international market (market #1); and 
this is larger than the international profits without domestic feed (equation: a.4). The model 
illustrates how the presence of domestic feed can improve the competitive position of an 
international carrier, as summarized in the following proposition: 
Proposition 1: The matching of domestic routes with an international route—
potentially via a merger that increases domestic-network size—enhances an airline’s 
share of the traffic and profits in the international market. 
 
Case C: International Competition With Domestic Network Feed & Monopolization 
*** Place Figure 3 Near Here *** 
 The third scenario (illustrated by figure 3) has firms A and B again competing in the 
international market (market #1) between points NY and UK. In this scenario, however, firm 
A no longer faces domestic competition: e.g., firm A has acquired firm C. Both cost functions 
and the market #1 inverse demand function remain identical to Case B; however, the inverse 
demand function for market #2 now reflects firm A’s monopoly position. Solving for the 
output equilibria we obtain: 
X*A,1 =  (a-c) (b+s) / (3b2 - s2)        (c.1)  
X*A,2  = (a-c) (3b+s) / 2(3b2 - s2)       (c.2) 
X*B,1 = (a-c) (2b+s) (b-s) / 2b (3b2-s2) .      (c.3) 
 Unsurprisingly, we observe that Firm A’s international market output dominates firm 
B’s (c.1 > c.3). More importantly, firm A’s international output has increased compared to 
the Case B scenario; the right hand side of (c.1) is greater than that of (b.2). It can 
correspondingly be shown that Firm A’s international profit increases in this domestic 
monopolization case compared to when Firm A had a domestic competitor (Case B). These 
  13
results suggest international competitive gains for airlines that eliminate domestic 
competition and allow the generation of a simple proposition: 
Proposition 2: The domination of domestic routes—potentially via a merger that 
reduces domestic competition—enhances an airline’s share of the traffic and profits 
in the international market. 
 The simple model of international airline competition, with its imperfectly 
competitive nature and role for network economies, illustrates the potential international 
competitive gains for airlines engaging in domestic mergers that enhance (increase the size) 
and consolidate (reduce route competition) domestic network structures. Case A 
demonstrated international competition without domestic feeder routes and had the two 
competitors split market output and profits evenly. Case B highlighted the proposed network-
expansion effect: an additional domestic feeder route—potentially via a domestic merger or 
acquisition—increases an airline’s international market output and profits (Proposition 1). 
Case C highlighted the proposed network-consolidation effect: eliminating domestic 
competitors—potentially via a domestic merger or acquisition—may further increase an 
airline’s international market output and profits (Proposition 2). In sum, propositions 1 and 2 
underscore that airlines improve international competitiveness by enhancing domestic 
networks and reducing domestic competition—both byproducts of domestic merger activity. 
 
EMPIRICAL TESTS AND RESULTS 
 The analysis of the impact of domestic mergers on international competitive 
performance involves an estimation procedure based on the features of both panel data and 
structural equations models. The strength of a structural equations approach resides in 
representing multiple relationships among a set of variables—in this particular case, the 
approach helps examine the causal paths by which domestic airline mergers impact 
international competitive outcomes. The strength of panel data methods resides in enhancing 
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causal inferences when data combine both cross-sectional and time-series qualities—in this 
particular case, the approach helps control for airline-route, airline country-of-origin and 
time-specific effects. Moreover, the empirical tests presented here examine whether domestic 
airline mergers improve international competitive position via two causal paths: first, via 
enhanced domestic networks (in line with proposition 1); second, via increased domestic 
dominance (in line with proposition 2). 
 
Data Set Description 
 The data for the empirical tests primarily derive from the International Civil Aviation 
Organization’s (ICAO) ‘Traffic by Flight Stage’ (TFS) series—a series that measures airline 
segment traffic between international city-pairs. In addition, data from ICAO’s ‘Traffic’ 
series complements the TFS data by capturing the broader characteristics of international 
airlines. Unfortunately, international-segment-traffic data include passengers flying between 
two international city-pairs that have origins and/or destinations beyond the segment city-
pairs. Consequently, the more a particular international city-pair segment involves a gateway 
to origins and/or destinations beyond the two city-pairs, the more the data may involve 
measurement error. While general opinion holds that origin-and-destination (O&D) data best 
reflect airline industry competition, such first-best data do not exist on a cross-national basis 
for the period of study. Simply put, the TFS international city-pair market segment data 
represent the best available alternative for studying the international markets between 
multiple nations over the 1984-1992 period.5 
 Consider the following in order to get an intuitive feel for the nature of the panel data 
employed for estimations. The data cover the international performance of forty-four airlines 
                                                 
5 Unreported tests based on data that aggregate international city-pair market segments into country-pair market segments 
(where the hubbing bias will be less pronounced) provide qualitatively similar results and support the segment-based tests 
reflecting O&D competition. Note also that non-US airlines do not often have multiple home-nation hubs or gateways; 
accordingly, international segment data will be less subject to measurement error for those observations. 
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from twenty nations over the 1984-1992 period.6 The data involve 10,161 observations where 
each observation consists of a specific airline’s yearly performance in a specific international 
city-pair market segment; i.e., observations are at the airline/route/year level-of-analysis. For 
instance, the performance by British Airways in the London-Montreal market-segment is one 
panel (airline-route) that consists of up to nine observations over the 1984-1992 period. 
Further, the data contain a total of 2,021 airline-routes. Reflect on the number of observations 
(10,161), the number of airline-routes (2,021) and the number of years (9); and the 
unbalanced nature of panels becomes obvious—no surprise in light of the fact that airlines 
tend to enter and exit markets frequently. Note that airlines must compete in a specific market 
to be included as an observation: i.e., no zero market-performance data points were 
included.7  
 A number of variables were generated from the TFS and TRF data series. While these 
variables will be employed in the subsequent section on ‘Estimation Strategy’, it behooves us 
here to set out and define the variables. The system of equations will include three 
endogenous variables: an airline’s domestic network size; an airline’s domestic market 
dominance; an airline’s market-share in the international market segment. 
 Testing proposition 1—mergers that enhance domestic networks improve 
international competitive performance—requires a measure of domestic network size. An 
airline’s number of annual domestic departures acts as the measure of domestic network size 
(referred to as Domestic-Network). While the number of domestic cities-served is often 
employed to measure network size (e.g., Caves et al., 1984), domestic departures roughly 
                                                 
6 First, see table 2 for a listing of the 44 airlines. Second, the 20 nations--Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom, and the United States—are referred to as the twenty advanced aviation nations. The OECD nations and the 
four more developed Latin American nations were initially selected, but a few OECD nations were dropped due to 
insufficient data. 
7 Further, any observations where the airline monopolized or dominated the international market segment (i.e., market-share 
> 90%) were dropped. Further, any observations where the airline was playing a marginal or fringe role (market-share < 1%) 
in the international market segment were also dropped.  
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capture domestic network size by representing the large set of domestic flights on which an 
airline can draw upon in order to establish an efficient domestic network. 
Testing proposition 2—mergers that reduce domestic competition improve 
international competitive performance—requires a measure of domestic market dominance. 
Taking an airlines share of total domestic passengers and dividing by home-nation domestic 
Herfindahl Index (HI), I created a measure that captures the degree to which an airline 
dominates its domestic market (referred to as Domestic-Dominance). This variable reflects 
whether the airline’s domestic market presence (as measured by share of domestic 
passengers) is relatively large or small compared to all domestic competitors (as measured by 
domestic HI). For example, imagine an airline with a 25% share of the domestic market: this 
market-share would be proportionate (Domestic-Dominance = 100) if the domestic market 
consisted of 4 equal competitors (HI=.25); relatively large (Domestic-Dominance > 100) if 
the domestic market was more competitive (i.e., HI < .25); and relatively small (Domestic-
Dominance < 100) if the market was less competitive (i.e., HI > .25). 
Testing both propositions’ 1 and 2 requires a measure of an airline’s competitive 
performance in international markets. An airline’s annual share of the revenue passengers in 
an international market segment acts as the measure of airline competitive performance 
(referred to as International-Market-Share). International market-shares are assumed then to 
roughly correlate with international market-profitability: the ultimate goal of airlines. Yet the 
realm of strategic competition supports a number of market outcomes, as it is difficult to 
predict competitor actions in a strategic environment. Accordingly, a one-to-one relationship 
between market-share and profitability will not be found in practice. Underscoring the 
difficulties of making a pure link between market-share and profits, Windle and Dresner 
(1992) find total-factor-productivity (TFP) to not consistently/robustly correlate with airline 
profitability; though, they do find change in TFP to partly correlate with change in profits. 
Nevertheless, Kurtz and Rhoades (1992) find evidence supporting a general link between 
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profits and market share; moreover, Adrangi et al. (1989) and Antoniou (1992) empirically 
support a link between airline-profits and market-shares. Accordingly, we move forward with 
market-share as a measure of airline performance, but are mindful of its deficiencies. 
Beyond the three endogenous variables, a number of additional variables will be 
helpful in setting out the system of equations: a measure of domestic merger activity; the 
number of home and foreign competitors on an international city-pair market-segment; an 
airline’s international network size. Table 1 provides concise descriptions for all the variables 
discussed above and below. 
*** Place Table 1 Near Here *** 
Testing both proposition 1 & 2 requires a measure of actual merger activity. Using a 
number of secondary sources, fifteen airlines were identified over the 1984-1992 period as 
engaging in domestic airline mergers.8 This data allowed the creation of a merger dummy 
variable (referred to as Merger) that was coded 1 in all the years subsequent to the year of an 
airline’s first domestic merger within the nine year period. 
The list of variables includes two measures of the number of competitors in a 
particular international market. The number of home-based and foreign-based competitors 
faced by an airline in a specific international city-pair market segment (referred to as Home-
Competitors and Foreign-Competitors respectively) captures simple but important drivers of 
actual airline market shares. Note that since the observations are arranged on an airline-route-
year basis, an observation for an airline that is the sole national carrier on a duopolistic route 
will have Home-Competitors=0 and Foreign-Competitors=1. 
                                                 
8 Meyer & Strong, 1992; Pustay, 1992; Oum, Taylor & Zhang, 1993; self-histories on the official websites of airlines; and 
additional websites covering the world airline industry: http://www.flash.net/~airline/tree.html; 
http://airlines.afriqonline.com/airlines/index.html; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Main_Page -- were all sources used to 
identify the domestic merger behavior of the 44 airlines in the sample. Two of the above sources were required to identify 
the completion date of an airline’s domestic merger. Note also that non-domestic-mergers (e.g., the acquisition of PanAm’s 
international operations by United and Delta Airlines) are not domestic airline mergers and are accordingly not identified as 
domestic airline mergers here. See Table 2 for a list of the 44 airlines in this study and a list of the years on which they made 
their first domestic airline merger and/or acquisition.  
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Lastly, the list of variables includes a measure of an airline’s international network 
size that complements the domestic network variable. Accordingly, an airline’s number of 
annual international departures acts as the measure of international network size (referred to 
as International-Network). Table 2 reports descriptive statistics that include the year when 
sampled airlines engage in their first domestic merger, the number of observations by airline, 
and the means for variables employed.  
*** Place Table 2 Near Here *** 
 
Estimation Strategy 
 Recall that domestic mergers are hypothesized to positively influence international 
competitive performance via two causal paths: first, via enhanced domestic networks (in line 
with proposition 1); second, via increased domestic dominance (in line with proposition 2). 
Accordingly, the intuition that large domestic networks and the elimination of domestic 
competitors allow an airline to take advantage of network economies and improve 
international competitive performance resides behind the empirical tests. If larger domestic 
networks and domestic market dominance improve an airline’s international competitive 
position, then it behooves airlines to seek domestic mergers that both expand and consolidate 
domestic network structures for international competitive rationales as well as domestic 
competitive rationales. 
 The first causal path (proposition 1) can be operationally reduced for empirical 
estimation to the following causal links: domestic airline mergers increase the size of 
domestic networks, and airlines with larger domestic networks garner larger market-shares in 
imperfectly competitive international markets. Similarly, the second causal path (proposition 
2) can be operationally reduced for empirical estimation to the following causal links: 
domestic airline mergers reduce domestic competition, and airlines that dominate domestic 
markets garner larger market-shares in imperfectly competitive international markets. 
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Accordingly, the empirically-operationalized causal paths implied by the two propositions 
can be illustrated as follows: 
Proposition 1—the Network-Expansion Effect:  
Mergers ? ^ Domestic-Networks ? ^ International-Market-Share   
 (3) 
Proposition 2—the Network-Consolidation Effect: 
Mergers ? ^ Domestic-Dominance ? ^ International-Market-Share  (4) 
 It is important to point out that the above causal-flows both skip one step in the causal 
process outlined earlier: namely, the empirically-operationalized proposition 1 neglects the 
concept of international efficiency which connects larger domestic networks with improved 
international market-shares (see causal-flow 1); and the empirically-operationalized 
proposition 2 neglects the concept of domestic efficiency which connects domestic 
dominance with improved international market-shares (see causal-flow 2). This 
simplification of the causal paths is taken in part to keep the structural equations modeling 
tractable; but more importantly, I lack consistent data on both the international and domestic 
efficiency of airlines.9  
In order to empirically test the two propositions, I generate a recursive econometric 
specification (RES) that consists of three structural equations with three endogenous 
variables: 
– Domestic-Networkit = a0 + a1 Mergerit + a2 International-Networkit-1 + a 3 Domestic-
Networkit-1 + α1i + δ1k + γ1t + ε1it      (RES.1) 
– Domestic-Dominanceit = b0 + b1 Mergerit + b2 Domestic-Dominanceit-1 + α2i + δ2k +  
γ2t + ε2it         (RES.2) 
                                                 
9 A previous paper version – where international efficiency data is brought in to the estimation – partially 
addresses this omission and simplification. The paper is available from the author on request.  
  20
– International-Market-Shareit= c0 + c1 Domestic-Networkit + c2 Domestic-Dominanceit 
+ j=1∑2 cj+2 (Home-Competitors)jit + j=1∑2 cj+4 (Foreign-Competitors) jit + c7 
International-Market-Shareit-1 + α3i + δ3k + γ3t + ε3it    (RES.3) 
where i indexes an airline’s international city-pair market segment, t indexes time, j allows for 
a convenient expression of the non-linear variables, k indexes an airline’s country-of-origin, 
αi represents the fixed panel-specific (airline-route) effect, δk  represents the fixed airline-
country effect, and γt captures the fixed period-specific effect. 
The individual equations within the system take advantage of the data’s panel-nature 
by controlling for three types of fixed effects. First, controlling for any airline-route (i.e., 
panel-specific) effect owing to an airline’s particular position in an individual international 
city-pair segment is represented by the term αi. Empirically, the panel-specific effect is 
estimated by employing a within-transformation (Wooldridge, 2002); thus, allowing for the 
control of an additional fixed-effect without introducing collinearity. Second, controlling for 
any airline-country effect owing to an airline’s country-of-origin is represented by the term 
δk. The airline-country effect allows holding constant any non-varying effects due to national 
customer loyalty, national regulatory policy, or other national characteristics residing behind 
an airline’s country-of-origin. Third, time-specific trends in international airline markets may 
also affect causal inferences on the explanatory variables; thus, introducing period effects can 
at least partially control for some of the time-specific trends. Accordingly, all of the reported 
regression equations within the system take advantage of the data’s panel nature by 
controlling for fixed ‘airline-route’, ‘airline-country’ and ‘period’ effects.  
Further, the equations within the above system present an additional econometric 
issue beyond the panel nature of the data: a lagged dependent variable is included as an 
explanatory variable in all three equations. The inclusion of lagged dependent variables 
means the individual equations can be considered static-score models (Finkel, 1995). With 
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static-score models, the coefficient estimates for explanatory variables should be interpreted 
as indicating change in the dependent variable. Or put differently, causal variable coefficient 
estimates measure the short-term, not long-term, effects on the dependent variable.10 
 Equation RES.1 represents the first-link in the recursive system outlined above, as it 
attempts to elicit the impact of actual domestic airline mergers on the size of an airline’s 
domestic network: the basis for the network-expansion effect. Beyond the dummy variable 
(Merger) that captures the impact of domestic airline mergers on domestic networks, the 
airlines lagged international network (International-Network) is also included as an 
explanatory variable in order to make better causal inferences on the merger dummy variable. 
Recall that the lagged dependent-variable is also included in the regression; thus, the 
coefficient estimates for the other explanatory variables can be interpreted as indicating 
change in the dependent variable (Domestic-Network). Accordingly – and despite potential 
under-specification – the nature of this first equation should lead to modest interpretations of 
merger-effects on domestic networks, as the merger dummy variable will simply capture the 
average post-merger change per year in domestic network size and not the full compounding 
effect of the merger on domestic network size.  
Equation RES.2 represents a second first-link in the recursive system outlined above, 
as it attempts to elicit the impact of actual domestic mergers on an airline’s dominance of the 
home domestic market: the basis for the network-consolidation effect. In addition to the 
merger dummy variable (Merger), the lagged dependent variable is again included as a 
regressor. Hence, the merger dummy variable’s coefficient estimate can be interpreted as 
indicating change in the dependent variable (Domestic-Dominance). Further, this equation 
should also lead to relatively modest interpretations of the merger-effect on domestic 
                                                 
10 One danger with introducing a lagged-dependent variable as a regressor is that it may be related to the residual-term; thus, 
leading to biased coefficient estimates. While diagnostics suggest no overtly significant relationship, Appendix A reports the 
same system of equations that will be estimated in Table 3 except for the exclusion of all lagged-dependent variables. The 
results in Appendix A actually support Propositions’ 1 & 2 more fully than the main results in Table 3 employing a static-
score model; thus, further reducing concerns of biased coefficient estimates. 
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dominance, as the dummy variable will again simply capture the average post-merger change 
per year in domestic market dominance for merging airlines.   
Equation RES.3 takes the final step by considering the impact of both domestic-
network and domestic-dominance on the international market shares of airlines. Beyond the 
two principal variables (Domestic-Networks & Domestic-Dominance) and the lagged 
dependent variable (International-Market-Sharet-1), the list of explanatory variables for this 
equation includes the number of home and foreign competitors faced by an airline in a 
specific international city-pair segment (Home-Competitors and Foreign-Competitors 
respectively). While the equation is assumed to be linear, the competitor variables may be 
non-linear in functional form (i.e., subject to increasing or decreasing returns). Potential non-
linearity in the competitor variables is particularly important to capture, as these variables are 
charged with controlling for both the nature of the imperfectly competitive environment and 
the source (home or foreign) of actual competition. If the competitor variables capture as 
much variation in the dependent variable as possible, then we can interpret the coefficient 
estimates of the main explanatory variables with more precision: i.e., the Domestic-Network 
and Domestic-Dominance variables will then account for any deviation between competitor-
projected international market-share and actual market share. The inclusion of the squared-
terms for the competitor variables passed F-tests for the incremental contribution of an added 
explanatory variable (Gujarati, 1988).  
 
Estimation Results & Interpretation 
The recursive nature of the system of equations allows unbiased estimation via an 
ordinary-least-squares (OLS) process: in effect, Domestic-Network and Domestic-
Dominance can be considered pre-determined variables in so far as International-Market-
Share is concerned (Maddala, 1992). Nevertheless, estimation efficiency of a non-
simultaneous system of equations can be improved if cross-equation correlations are taken 
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into account; hence, calling for estimation via a seemingly-unrelated-regression (SUR) 
process – i.e., a Zellner (1962) regression.  Further, it behooves us to ensure that Domestic-
Network and Domestic-Dominance can be effectively treated as exogenous regressors in 
equation RES.3; thus, calling for a two-stage-least-squares (2SLS) and three-stage-least-
squares (3SLS) estimation process. The two-stage-least-squares process replaces the 
potentially dependent regressors with predicted values to ensure independence with the 
stochastic disturbance term. The three-stage-least-squares process involves both a 2SLS-like 
purification of potentially dependent regressors and a SUR-like accounting of cross-equation 
correlations. Table 3 accordingly presents the recursive system-of-equations estimated via the 
OLS, SUR, 2SLS and 3SLS processes to ensure consistency and robustness of results across 
specifications.11 
*** Place Table 3 Near Here *** 
The four estimation procedures generate statistically significant results that conform 
to expectation: the system-weighted R-squares – generated for the SUR and 3SLS procedures 
– are .52; and all the coefficient estimates for the principal explanatory variables have the 
expected sign and are significant at the 1% or 5% level. While the estimation results conform 
across models, the 3SLS (where both endogenous regressors are instrumented and cross-
equation correlations factored) estimation procedure is a bit more ambitious than the rest, and 
appears to yield slightly more modest coefficient-estimate interpretations. For this reason, 
and for brevity, the following analysis concentrates on the 3SLS estimation procedure while 
discussing the results equation by equation. 
Equation RES.1 (the Domestic-Network equation) estimates a fixed-and-period 
effects specification that yields a single-equation R-square of .64 via the 2SLS and OLS 
                                                 
11 The following variables were employed as instruments for the 2SLS & 3SLS estimation processes: Merger, Home-
Competitors, Home-Competitors2, Foreign-Competitors, Foreign-Competitors2, lagged International-Network, lagged 
Domestic-Network, lagged Domestic-Dominance, lagged International-Load-Factor (percentage of an airline’s seats in an 
international market segment filled by revenue passengers), lagged International-Aircraft-Size (average annual size – 
number of seats – of aircraft employed by an airline on an international market segment), lagged International-Market-Size 
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procedures; hence, the equation appears relatively well specified. Further—and more 
importantly—all the coefficient estimates meet expectation and are significant at the 1% 
level. The coefficient estimates for lagged Domestic-Network (.781) and lagged 
International-Network (.098) are positive and significant; hence, airlines with larger domestic 
and international networks tend in the near-future to have larger domestic networks. In 
particular, the relatively large coefficient estimate for the lagged dependent variable indicates 
a relatively slow adjustment pace: where λ reflects adjustment pace (λ = 1- α3) and thus 
equals 0.219 on average (Martin, 1979). Simply put, domestic networks are not created anew 
each year. The variable of principal interest is the merger dummy variable: the coefficient 
estimate for Merger (10,337) implies that airlines engaging in domestic mergers experience 
an average yearly increase in the size of their domestic network of some 10,377 departures 
per year (9% of the sample’s average ‘domestic network size’—see Table 2). Accordingly, 
domestic airline mergers tend to generate larger domestic networks. 
 Equation RES.2 (the Domestic-Dominance equation) estimates a fixed-and-period 
effects specification that yields a single-equation R-square of .43 via the 2SLS and OLS 
procedures; hence, the equation appears relatively well specified. Further—and more 
importantly—all the coefficient estimates meet expectation and are significant at the 1% 
level. The coefficient estimate for lagged Domestic-Dominance (.646) suggests that past-
levels of domestic market dominance substantially impact future levels of domestic 
dominance; again, the adjustment pace is relatively slow. The variable of principal interest is 
the merger dummy variable: the coefficient estimate for Merger (2.04) indicates that airlines 
engaging in domestic mergers experience a post-merger increase in domestic market 
dominance. 
Regression RES.3 estimates a fixed-and-period effects specification that yields a 
single-equation R-square of .33 via the 2SLS and OLS procedures; hence, the equation 
                                                                                                                                                        
(total number of annual revenue-passengers traveling in an international market segment). All of the instruments passed 
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appears relatively well specified. Further—and more importantly—all the coefficient 
estimates meet expectation and are significant at the 1% level (except for the Domestic-
Dominance coefficient estimate at the 5% level). The coefficient estimate for Domestic-
Network (.000024) implies that an airline increasing annual domestic departures by 100,000 
increases international market shares by 2.4 percentage points on average. The coefficient 
estimate for Domestic-Dominance (.032) implies that airlines engaging in domestic mergers 
that increase the domestic dominance index by 31.25 points increase international market 
shares by 1.0 percentage point on average. The coefficient estimate for Home-Competitors 
indicates declining market shares with increased counts of home competitors on a route; yet, 
the squared term indicates a moderated decline at higher levels of home competition. 
Similarly, the coefficient estimate for Foreign-Competitors indicates declining market shares 
with increased counts of foreign competitors; though, the squared term again indicates a 
moderated decline at higher levels of foreign competition. Lastly, the coefficient-estimate for 
the lagged dependent variable (.27) indicates a relatively rapid-adjustment pace; accordingly, 
international market shares are far more dynamic than domestic network size and domestic 
market dominance. Since equation RES.3 represents the core of the structural equations 
testing, it behooves us to discuss some coefficient estimates (namely Domestic-Network, 
Domestic-Dominance, and the competitor variables) with a bit more detail. 
First, the empirical results indicate statistical significance for the domestic network 
size variable; yet, the economic significance of the coefficient estimates is far more important 
than statistical significance. Consider the following actual merger-induced changes to 
domestic network size to better understand the economic significance of domestic airline 
networks. Northwest increased its domestic network size by 323,000 annual domestic 
departures when it acquired Republic Airlines; thus, the coefficient estimate suggests that 
Northwest increased its post-merger international market performance by 7.8 percentage 
                                                                                                                                                        
diagnostics concerning any potential relationship with residual error terms. Further, the system fulfills the rank condition.  
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points. Similar use of the Domestic-Network coefficient estimate allows approximating the 
international market gains for other domestic-airline mergers: the Delta/Western airline 
merger translates into international city-pair market gains of 4.4 percentage points; the series 
of mergers that led to Canadian Airlines translate into a 2 percentage point increase; and the 
British-Airways/British-Caledonia and Air-France/Air-Inter mergers translate into gains of 
around 0.5 percentage points. 
 Second, the empirical results indicate statistical significance for the domestic-
dominance variable; yet, it again bears analyzing the economic significance. Consider the 
following actual merger-induced changes to the domestic market dominance index to better 
understand economic significance. British Airways increased market dominance by 30.5 
points when it acquired British Caledonia; thus, the coefficient estimate suggests that BA 
increased its post-merger international market performance by almost 1 percentage point. 
Northwest and Continental Airlines both increased domestic market dominance by around 47 
points; thus, suggesting that both airlines experienced a 1.5 percentage point increase in 
international market shares on average. Finally, the series of mergers that led to Canadian 
Airlines translate into a 1.7 percentage point increase due to enhanced domestic market 
dominance. 
 Third, the results concerning the competitor variables is worth consideration as the 
impact of foreign-competitors on an airline’s international-market-share appears to dominate 
the impact of home-competitors. While this observation is born out, the impact is not as 
significant as a first glance at the coefficient estimates might suggest. Recall that the typical 
airline-route-year observation involves a duopoly situation where Home-Competitors=0 and 
Foreign-Competitors=1; hence, a good comparison of the marginal impact of an additional 
home or foreign competitor would take such a duopoly as a starting benchmark. Using that 
benchmark and taking into account the squared terms allows factoring the net-impact of an 
additional competitor on a focal airline’s international-market-share: an additional home-
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competitor leads to a 8.5 percentage point drop in market-share on average, while an 
additional foreign-competitor leads to a 13.5 percentage point drop in market-share on 
average. In short, foreign competitors appear to represent a more vigorous competitive threat 
than do home competitors. This may owe to the fact that national consumers prefer home-
nation airlines (Yoo & Ashford, 1997); hence, an additional foreign airline has a better 
chance of shifting foreign consumers away from a focal airline than does an additional home 
airline. In line with this conjecture, comparisons of the impact of additional home and foreign 
competitors in situations with more than duopolistic competition indicate that the marginal 
impact of an additional home and foreign competitor begin to equilibrate; i.e., all those 
foreign-consumers who were predisposed to favor a foreign-airline have already expressed 
that preference.  
 In sum, the results above suggest that domestic airline mergers lead to improved 
international competitive performance via both a network-enhancement and a network-
consolidation effect. In terms of network-enhancement: domestic airline mergers lead to 
larger domestic networks which in turn lead to higher international-market-shares. In terms 
of network-consolidation: domestic airline mergers lead to more domestic market dominance 
which in turn leads to higher international market shares. Moreover, the results also allow 
factoring the indirect structural effect of domestic mergers on international-market-share in 
order to gather which causal path is relatively more robust. Employing the standardized 
coefficient estimates (see Mueller 1996 for more process details) suggests that the indirect 
structural effect of Merger on International-Market-Share via Domestic-Network is 
quadruple the indirect structural effect of Merger on International-Market-Share via 
Domestic-Dominance. In short, the majority of gains (80%) from engaging in domestic 
mergers derive from enlarging domestic networks. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
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 My main contention has been that the domestic airline merger activity of the late 
1980s and early 1990s had an important international dimension, as domestic mergers 
improve an airline’s international competitive position. The domestic competitive incentives 
(efficiency-gains and market-power) focused on by the IO literature clearly play a significant 
role in determining airline merger activity; however, a complete explanation of the cross-
national domestic airline merger phenomenon appears to require consideration of 
international incentives. International competitive gains are particularly vital in explaining 
the proliferation of domestic airline mergers to nations where international markets 
predominated and/or where domestic markets remained regulated. 
 The main contention that domestic airline mergers improve international 
competitiveness rests upon two proposed causal paths. First, a network-enhancement path 
which suggests that airlines with large domestic networks reap efficiency gains in 
international operations that translate into larger international market shares. Second, a 
network-consolidation path which suggests that airlines with less domestic competition reap 
efficiency gains in domestic operations that translate into larger international market shares. 
A simple Cournot model reflects the theoretical backing, generates formal propositions 
concerning the network-enhancement and network-consolidation effects, and establishes the 
logic behind the empirical tests. In short, the model formally clarifies the main contention by 
illustrating that mergers—which enhance domestic networks and reduce domestic 
competitors—generate international competitive gains.  
The empirical tests employ a structural equations approach based on comprehensive 
panel data covering the international airline markets between twenty advanced aviation 
nations over the 1984-1992 period. The empirical results yield supporting evidence for the 
network-enhancement effect: domestic mergers lead to larger domestic networks, which in 
turn lead to higher international market shares. The empirical results also yield supporting 
evidence for the network-consolidation effect: domestic mergers lead to the dominance of 
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domestic markets which in turn leads to higher international market shares. In short, the 
empirical results clearly support the presence of an international competitive incentive behind 
domestic airline mergers that enhance domestic airline networks and reduce domestic 
competition. 
Domestic airline mergers appear to have an important international dimension; hence, 
completely understanding the domestic airline merger phenomenon requires analyzing both 
the international context and international determinants of domestic merger activity. An IB 
perspective can then complement the traditional IO approach to airline competition issues by 
widening the analytical frame to include cross-national business activity (e.g., non-US 
domestic airline mergers) and by prodding the discovery of cross-border interactions that 
affect domestic strategies and actions (e.g., international competitive incentives behind 
domestic mergers).  
In sum, the argument here is simple but important: first, the IO and IB perspectives 
complement each other by helping better diagnose and analyze the motives behind the 
domestic airline merger phenomenon; second, the cross-national domestic airline merger 
phenomenon was driven by international, as well as domestic, competitive incentives. 
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Table 1: Variable Descriptions 
 
Variables Description 
Domestic- 
Network 
An airline’s number of annual domestic departures 
Domestic-
Dominance 
(An airline’s annual share of domestic passengers) / (Domestic 
Herfindahl Index for that airline’s home domestic market) 
International-
Market-Share 
An airline’s annual share of the revenue passengers in an international 
market segment 
Merger Dummy variable coded 1 for all years subsequent to the completion-
year of an airline’s first domestic merger within the 1984-1992 period 
Home- 
Competitors 
Number of competitor airlines in an international market segment that 
come from the home-nation of the focal airline 
Foreign-
Competitors 
Number of competitor airlines in an international market segment that 
come from a foreign-nation relative to the focal airline 
International-
Network 
An airline’s number of annual international departures 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics – Domestic Merger Activity, Number of Observations & Variable Means by Airline 
Airlines Year of 1st 
Merger 
# 
Obs. 
International-
Market-Share 
Domestic-
Dominance 
Domestic-
Network 
Home-
Competitors 
Foreign-
Competitors 
International-
Network 
Aerl. Argentinas 1990 50 50.03 124.34 50,305 0 1.400 12,924 
AerLingus -- 64 60.70 100.02 4,695 0.063 1.141 35,352 
AeroMexico -- 130 30.79 87.68 65,504 0.415 1.546 14,483 
Air Canada -- 232 50.11 133.15 120,306 0.138 1.129 40,987 
Air France 1988 972 45.31 24.31 23,879 0.015 1.158 156,621 
Air UK -- 12 40.58 22.10 29,939 0.667 0.667 23,104 
AirNewZealand -- 176 55.83 100.00 55,415 0 1.102 13,137 
Alaska 1986 44 34.61 11.34 105,487 0.364 1.318 7,348 
Alitalia -- 830 47.35 92.60 44,900 0.005 1.070 72,285 
All Nippon -- 20 29.45 141.82 160,745 1.000 1.500 6,661 
American 1987 277 44.73 151.53 690,602 0.874 1.036 73,035 
Brit Airways 1987 1,131 48.07 147.88 81,633 0.232 1.202 177,460 
Brit Caledonia -- 82 17.37 16.40 12,610 0.902 1.244 22,341 
Brit Midland -- 13 16.02 55.92 37,905 1.846 1.000 20,310 
Britannia 1988 6 6.98 4.30 1,295 1.000 1.000 1,069 
Canadian 1986 173 49.56 87.47 92,561 0.069 1.104 15,171 
Continental 1986 201 42.63 73.71 397,749 1.080 1.154 34,115 
Cruziero -- 16 40.05 79.67 41,168 0.500 1.000 3,781 
Delta 1986 59 48.21 153.15 756,745 0.390 1.051 38,897 
Eastern -- 76 33.71 105.14 388,495 0.724 0.816 34,852 
Finnair -- 98 58.41 116.69 34,643 0 1.010 29,147 
Frontier -- 4 57.37 24.10 100,642 1.000 0 3,558 
Iberia -- 628 52.10 133.52 93,618 0.041 1.056 65,320 
JAL -- 217 42.36 64.00 48,742 0.166 1.852 41,887 
KLM 1988 404 56.96 102.19 4,209 0 1.114 90,509 
Ladeco -- 35 23.34 115.09 10,567 0.686 1.200 3,815 
LanChile -- 20 49.76 95.07 9,621 0.900 1.250 6,250 
Lufthansa -- 1,243 49.23 101.38 129,600 0.015 1.128 174,388 
Mexicana -- 163 54.34 107.59 65,497 0.172 1.276 21,118 
Northwest 1986 190 35.30 72.08 387,208 1.368 1.068 32,939 
Olympic -- 199 44.32 100.00 55,329 0 1.045 21,580 
PacificSW -- 4 11.82 19.29 108,931 1.000 1.500 182 
PanAm -- 402 35.61 18.78 70,961 1.032 1.127 73,261 
Qantas 1992 257 48.42 0 0 0 1.163 26,582 
Republic -- 3 60.68 72.59 357,360 1.000 0 8,633 
SwissAir 1991 534 50.28 119.39 18,231 0 1.082 89,916 
TAP -- 302 51.27 116.08 13,607 0.013 1.033 19,142 
TWA 1986 291 36.19 54.51 267,311 1.285 1.089 21,936 
United -- 189 35.47 133.54 616,390 1.063 1.016 37,016 
US Air 1987 38 47.64 94.72 559,862 0.921 0.447 16,748 
UTA -- 10 59.37 0 0 1.000 0.100 9,332 
Varig -- 271 45.26 136.76 73,784 0.063 1.103 13,637 
Virgin -- 48 21.62 0 0 1.042 3.000 3,338 
Western -- 47 41.06 44.53 152,898 0.128 1.170 14,130 
All Airlines  10,161 46.44 94.51 117,314 0.257 1.143 88,220 
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Table 3: Estimation Results for the Recursive Econometric Specification 
* All Equations Incorporate Fixed ‘Airline-Route’, ‘Airline-Country’ & ‘Period’ Effects 
 
Explanatory  
Variables 
OLS 
Estimation 
SUR 
Estimation 
2SLS 
Estimation 
3SLS 
Estimation 
 
Equation RES.1 (Dependent Variable = Domestic-Network) 
Constant -3500.50** 
(1088) 
-3859.57**     
(1085) 
-3500.50**     
(1088) 
-3852.23**     
(1085) 
Merger 9892.789**   
(1015) 
10340.28**    
(1002) 
9892.789**     
(1015) 
10336.57**     
(1002) 
International-Network t-1 
   
0.168457**  
(0.0184) 
0.097428**    
(0.0168) 
0.168457**     
(0.0184) 
0.098156**     
(0.0168) 
Domestic-Network t-1 
   
0.755446**    
(0.0065) 
0.780817**    
(0.0060) 
0.755446**     
(0.0065) 
0.780730**     
(0.0060) 
 
Single-Equation R-Sqr  
 
.64 
  
.64 
 
 
Equation RES.2 (Dependent Variable = Domestic-Dominance) 
Constant 1.506867**  
(0.3607) 
1.507725**    
(0.3607) 
1.506867**     
(0.3607) 
1.506814**     
(0.3607) 
Merger 2.031798**  
(0.3172) 
2.045160**    
(0.3169) 
2.031798**     
(0.3172) 
2.038416**     
(0.3169)   
Domestic-Dominance t-1 
 
0.651729**  
(0.0078) 
0.646162**    
(0.0071) 
0.651729**     
(0.0078) 
0.646246**     
(0.0071) 
 
Single-Equation R-Sqr  
 
.43 
  
.43 
 
 
Equation RES.3 (Dependent Variable = International-Market-Share) 
Constant -1.97052**     
(0.4605) 
-1.87715**    
(0.4605) 
-1.96154**     
(0.4595) 
-1.94756**     
(0.4595) 
Domestic-Network 
   
0.000020**      
(2.818E-6) 
0.000023**     
(2.817E-6)   
0.000023**      
(3.576E-6) 
0.000024**      
(3.575E-6) 
Domestic-Dominance 
 
0.049775**     
(0.0102) 
0.034720**    
(0.0102) 
0.033157*     
(0.0158) 
0.031957*     
(0.0158) 
Home-Competitors -9.65382**     
(0.5784)  
-9.69047**    
(0.5783)  
-9.67951**     
(0.5799)  
-9.65179**     
(0.5795) 
(Home-Competitors)2 1.359866**     
(0.1398)   
1.353376**    
(0.1397) 
1.355427**     
(0.1399) 
1.351183**     
(0.1398) 
Foreign-Competitors -25.9279**     
(0.6038)   
-25.9128**    
(0.6036) 
-25.8848**     
(0.6044) 
-25.8904**     
(0.6039) 
(Foreign-Competitors)2 4.128725**     
(0.1311) 
4.127486**    
(0.1311) 
4.129876**     
(0.1313) 
4.126842**     
(0.1312) 
International-Market-
Share t-1 
0.271808**     
(0.0071)  
0.271531**    
(0.0071) 
0.272538**     
(0.0071) 
0.272147**     
(0.0071) 
 
Single-Equation R-Sqr 
 
.33 
  
.33 
 
 
System Weighted R-Sqr 
 
 
 
.52 
 
 
 
.52 
Observations 10,161 10,161 10,161 10,161 
     
(  ) = Standard Errors; ** = 1% Significance; * = 5% Significance 
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Appendix A: Estimation Results for the Recursive Econometric Specification 
• All Equations Incorporate Fixed ‘Airline-Route’, ‘Airline-Country’ & ‘Period’ Effects 
• All Equations are Non-Static-Score Models 
  
Explanatory  
Variables 
OLS 
Estimation 
SUR 
Estimation 
2SLS 
Estimation 
3SLS 
Estimation 
 
Equation RES.1 (Dependent Variable = Domestic-Network) 
Constant -12921.9**    
(1655.368) 
-13526.1**    
(1652.916) 
-12921.9**    
(1655.368) 
-13526.1**    
(1652.916) 
Merger 32998.31**    
(1519.239) 
34129.64**    
(1510.709) 
32998.31**    
(1519.239) 
34129.64**    
(1510.709) 
International-Network t-1 
   
0.382417**    
(0.027962) 
0.324920**    
(0.026646) 
0.382417**    
(0.027962) 
0.324920**    
(0.026646) 
 
Single-Equation R-Sqr  
 
.17 
  
.17 
 
 
Equation RES.2 (Dependent Variable = Domestic-Dominance) 
Constant 1.755407**    
(0.469506) 
1.755839**    
(0.469506) 
1.755407**    
(0.469506) 
1.755839**    
(0.469506) 
Merger 4.675036**    
(0.410852) 
4.678185**    
(0.410850) 
4.675036**    
(0.410852) 
4.678185**    
(0.410850) 
 
Single-Equation R-Sqr  
 
.03 
  
.03 
 
 
Equation RES.3 (Dependent Variable = International-Market-Share) 
Constant -0.29702     
(0.490346) 
-0.20769    
(0.490345) 
-0.29702    
(0.490346) 
-0.20769    
(0.490345) 
Domestic-Network 
   
0.000025**     
 (3.01E-6) 
0.000029**    
(3.009E-6) 
0.000025**     
(3.01E-6) 
0.000029**    
(3.009E-6) 
Domestic-Dominance 
 
0.060172**    
(0.010939) 
0.058780**    
(0.010938) 
0.060172**    
(0.010939) 
0.058780**    
(0.010938) 
Home-Competitors -10.4588**    
 (0.618322) 
-10.4597**    
(0.618262) 
-10.4588**    
(0.618322) 
-10.4597**    
(0.618262) 
(Home-Competitors)2 1.506583**    
(0.149463) 
1.506229**    
(0.149449) 
1.506583**    
(0.149463) 
1.506229**    
(0.149449) 
Foreign-Competitors -28.7427**    
 (0.640991) 
-28.7413**    
(0.640929) 
-28.7427**    
(0.640991) 
-28.7413**    
(0.640929) 
(Foreign-Competitors)2 4.592867**    
(0.139673) 
  4.590632**    
(0.139660) 
4.592867**    
(0.139673) 
  4.590632**    
(0.139660) 
 
Single-Equation R-Sqr 
 
.23 
  
.23 
 
 
System Weighted R-Sqr 
 
 
 
.15 
 
 
 
.15 
Observations 10,161 10,161 10,161 10,161 
     
(  ) = Standard Errors; ** = 1% Significance;  
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